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CHAPTER 10 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS ]. NICHOLSON, s.]. 
§lO.l. Jones Act: Application of federal law. Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins,1 overruling Swift v. Tyson,2 held that the Rules of Decision Acta 
requires federal courts in diversity cases, when deciding nonfederal 
issues of substantive law, to follow state court decisions as well as state 
statutes. The Erie rule is inapplicable when the case does not come 
to the federal court by reason of its diversity jurisdiction. If a "federal 
question" is the basis of the jurisdiction, that is, if the case is one 
"arising under" the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States,4 then a federal conflict of laws rule may be used in the disposi-
tion of the case. Hence in admiralty suits the federal courts are not 
bound by state conflicts law.5 If the case is governed by a federal 
statute, it is clear that state conflict of laws rules have no bearing on 
the case. 
When state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in "fed-
eral question" actions, the state court, in trying such a case, is bound 
by the supremacy of the federal law and must apply the applicable 
federal principles of law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
in Boudreau v. Boat Andrea G. Corporation,6 an admiralty action, held 
that the rights of the parties were governed by the apposite federal 
statute. 
The plaintiff in Boudreau, as administratrix of her husband's estate, 
brought an action for damages against the owner of a fishing vessel 
upon which her husband, a crew member, had died. The first count 
sounded in negligence under the Jones Act.7 The second count al-
leged that the decedent's death was caused by the unseaworthiness of 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College 
Law School and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§10.1. 1304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842). 
a 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1964). 
4 See U.S. Const., Art. III, §2. 
5 Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 377, 386 (1957). See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 
571, 577, 73 Sup. Ct. 921, 925, 97 L. Ed. 1254, 1264-1265 (1953). 
6350 Mass. 473, 215 N.E.2d 907 (1966), also noted in §4.8 supra. 
746 U.S.C. §688 (1964). The Jones Act gives the personal representative of a 
deceased seaman the right to bring suit when the seaman's death was the result 
of a personal injury suffered in the course of his employment and expressly makes 
applicable to such suit the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Acts, 
45 U.S.C. §§51·60, "conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the 
case of railroad employees." The Jones Act says nothing about negligence but in-
corporates by reference the negligence provision of the F.E.L.A. 
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the defendant's vessel and was brought under the Death on the High 
Seas Act.s A third count, for cure and maintenance under general 
maritime law, was by agreement of the parties left for finding by the 
trial judge and did not become a part of the appeal proceedings. The 
case was tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence, the judge, subject 
to the plaintiff's exception, directed a verdict for the defendant on 
both of the first two counts. 
Before considering the merits, the Supreme Judicial Court dealt 
with a jurisdictional question. It is settled doctrine that state and 
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in Jones Act actions.9 
Jurisdiction with respect to suits under the Death on the High Seas 
Act is exclusively in the federal district court.10 The Court ruled, 
therefore, that an action under the High Seas Act may not be joined 
with a suit under the Jones Act in a state court and dismissed the 
second count for want of jurisdiction. 
The Court then summarized the evidence in order to consider the 
propriety of the directed verdict for the defendant on the first count 
under the Jones Act. In the evening of November 13, 1962, the vessel 
Andrea G. was 70 miles off-shore heading for fishing grounds. The 
decedent, hired as a deckhand, was making his first trip on the boat 
and, at the time stated, was at the wheel in the pilothouse which was 
hot and stuffy because of a defective heat regulator. In addition, the 
pilot house door was warped and had to be kicked or pushed with 
the shoulder to open it. This condition had existed for some time. The 
captain and the crew were aroused by a noise on deck and they found 
the decedent, in a moribund condition, lying on the deck with his 
foot on the step leading to the door of the pilothouse. 
The Court held that the evidence relating to the fatal accident and 
the medical testimony as to the cause of death established a case for 
the jury under the Jones Act and hence the directed verdict was not 
warranted. Federal standards, by which the rights of a seaman or his 
personal representative are to be measured under the Jones Act, 
clearly dictated this conclusion. The United States Supreme Court 
S 46 U.S.C. §§761-768 (1964). The Death on the High Seas Act provides a remedy 
for death "caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas 
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State." The availability of the al-
ternative remedy under the High Seas Act can be important because, although 
like the Jones Act the High Seas Act limits recovery to a list of designated bene-
ficiaries, the lists in the two statutes are not identical. Another reason for the 
common practice in federal courts of joining counts under both acts in a death 
action is that the Jones Act, unlike the High Seas Act, provides that the dece-
dent's right of action for pain and suffering before death survives for the benefit 
of the statutory beneficiaries. See Gilmore Be Black, Admiralty 301-308 (1957). 
9 Gilmore Be Black, Admiralty 287 (1957). See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 
571, 574 n.4, 73 Sup. Ct. 921, 924 n.4, 97 L. Ed. 1254, 1263 n.4 (1953); Engel v. 
Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 46 Sup. Ct. 410, 70 L. Ed. 813 (1926). 
10 Gilmore Be Black, Admiralty 304 (1957). See Romero v. International Terminal 
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 369 n.25, 371 n.28, 79 Sup. Ct. 468, 478 n.25, 479 n.28, 3 
L. Ed. 2d 368, 380 n.25, 381 n.28 (1959) (dictum); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 
121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954). 
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has stated that "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs 
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played 
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for 
which damages are sought."ll The "liberal construction" which should 
be given to the Jones Act,12 requires that the evidence be considered 
most favorably to the seaman so that the jury which, under the act, 
"plays a pre-eminent role," may decide the issues.13 
Applying these standards, the jury could find that the defendant was 
negligent in maintaining the heat regulator and the door to the pilot-
house. The jury could also conclude that excessive heat, combined 
with heaving against a door that refused to open, followed by falling 
to the deck after being catapulted from the pilothouse, could have 
aggravated the decedent's pre-existing heart condition and caused his 
death. The Court, therefore, sustained the plaintiff's exception to the 
directed verdict on the first count. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established the su-
premacy of federal maritime law over state common law, while it has 
simultaneously, under the Erie doctrine, established the supremacy of 
state common law over the general federal common law.14 The Su-
preme Court has affirmed the supremacy of federal law even when mari-
time tort suits are tried in state courts.15 There has been little or no 
confusion with respect to the supremacy doctrine in Jones Act cases. 
Since in suits under the Jones Act, the courts, state or federal, are 
dealing with a federal statute which states its own rules, little dif-
ficulty can arise as to the choice between federal and state law. It is 
clear, therefore, that a state which undertakes to enforce federally 
created maritime rights cannot dilute claims fashioned by federal 
power "which is dominant in this field."16 The decision of the Supreme 
Judicial Court in the Boudreau case recognized this supremacy of 
federal maritime law and is in accord with the past practice of the 
Court,l7 
§lO.2. Jones Act: Choice of law rule. Tort cases in admiralty raise 
problems with respect to choice of law. The traditional lex loci delicti 
principle had been commonly accepted as governing the rights of the 
parties in maritime tort cases. But since the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen,! the "significant con-
11 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 Sup. Ct. 443, 448, I L. 
Ed. 2d 493, 499 (1957). 
12 Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790, 69 Sup. Ct. 1317, 
1321, 93 L. Ed. 1692, 1697 (1949). 
13 Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523, 77 Sup. Ct. 457, 
458, I L. Ed. 2d 51I, 513 (1957). 
14 See Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 374-377 (1957). 
15 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 Sup. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 
239 (1942). 
16 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-410, 74 Sup. Ct. 202, 205, 98 
L. Ed. 143, 151 (1954). 
17 See Keough v. Cefalo, 330 Mass. 57, 60, 1I0 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1953). 
§10.2. 1345 U.S. 571, 73 Sup. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953). 
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tacts" rule is on the ascendancy as it is generally in the tort area. In 
Lauritzen the Court suggested the following seven possible bases for 
substantive choice of law: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the 
flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) allegiance of 
the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract of hiring; (6) inacces-
sibility of a foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. The actual 
holding in the case was that Danish law, not the Jones Act, controlled 
with respect to an injury suffered by a Danish seaman on a Danish 
ship in Cuban territorial waters under a contract of hiring made in 
New York. 
The decision of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts in Filippou v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navizione2 
is in accord with this recent development in admiralty tort cases. In 
Filippou the plaintiff seaman brought an action under the Jones Act 
and the general maritime law to recover for injuries received while he 
was serving as a crew member of a vessel owned by the defendant 
corporation. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a resident of 
Greece and that the defendant was a foreign corporation which had a 
place of business in Massachusetts and owned the vessel in question, 
which carried passengers between Europe and the United States. It 
was silent as to the citizenship of the plaintiff, as to the place where 
the injury occurred, as to the place where the voyage began and ended, 
and as to where the plaintiff signed on as a member of the crew. The 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court, applying 
the choice of law criteria of Lauritzen, had held that the general 
maritime law of the United States, including the Jones Act, is not 
applicable in an action involving an injury sustained by a foreign 
seaman on board a foreign vessel in the course of a voyage beginning 
and ending in a foreign country, even when the injury was sustained 
in an American port.s While the admiralty courts of the United States 
do have jurisdiction over maritime suits between foreigners, the court 
may properly dismiss such a case at its discretion when the plaintiff's 
injuries have no significant contact with the United States, and United 
States law is not applicable. 
The district court found that the complaint failed to allege suffi-
cient facts to bring the case within the Jones Act or the general mari-
time law of the United States, or to establish that the court was in any 
way a convenient forum. It, therefore, allowed the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
In admiralty cases the courts must apply those choice of law rules 
that are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law 
and that take into account the legitimate concern of the international 
community in the regulation of maritime commerce. The present case, 
2254 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1966). 
3 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 Sup. Ct. 
468, 3 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1959). 
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following the reasoning of Lauritzen and Romero, properly assessed 
the interacting interests of the United States and of the foreign 
countries concerned.4 
§lO.3. Federal question jurisdiction: Federal common law. The 
proposition that "there is no federal general common law," enunciated 
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,1 does not apply when a cause of action 
involves a paramount federal interest. In such cases federal law must 
control and, in the absence of a federal statute, federal courts must 
develop a federal common law even in areas in which state common 
law also exists.2 The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts has reaffirmed this priority of federal law in Nationwide 
Charters and Conventions, Inc. v. Garber.3 
The plaintiff brought suit in a Massachusetts court charging the 
defendants with an abuse of process that led to the destruction of the 
plaintiff's business. The defendants allegedly persuaded an airline 
company to bring a suit against the plaintiff in the federal district 
court under the Federal Aviation Act. The latter suit charged the 
plaintiff with engaging in unauthorized air transportation and asked 
for an injunction against such conduct. The injunction was issued and 
the plaintiff sought redress in the Massachusetts court for the resultant 
damage to its business. The defendants removed the case to the federal 
district court, alleging that the latter court had original jurisdiction of 
the cause under the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code, 
Section 1331(a).4 The plaintiff then moved to remand the case to the 
Massachusetts court. 
The district court found that the plaintiff's argument in support of 
the motion to remand was basically that abuse of process was a com-
mon law tort which derived from state law and that the right to 
recover for it was governed by state law. The court disagreed, pointing 
out that the process alleged to have been abused was federal process, 
which raised a federal question. The federal interest involved was the 
essential concern of the federal courts with the integrity of their 
process, a kind of housekeeping or policing function; it was necessary 
that this problem be resolved uniformly regardless of the plaintiff's 
choice of remedy. Federal law, therefore, governed the claim. 
It was not necessary for the district court to spell out the applicable 
federal law, and it limited itself to observing that federal courts have 
4 See also Volkenburg P.P.A. v. Nederland·Amerik. Stoomv. Maats, 336 F.2d 480 
(1st Cir. 1964). 
§10.3. 1304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
2 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 Sup. Ct. 573, 87 L. Ed. 
838 (1943); Greenberg v. Panama Transport Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960), 
rev'd on other groundS, 290 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1961). 
3254 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mass. 1966). 
428 U.S.C. §1331(a) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States." 
5
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frequently developed a federal common law when they have discerned 
a paramount federal interest. The district court thus properly held 
that it had jurisdiction under Section 1331(a) and denied the plaintiff's 
motion to remand. 
§lO.4. Interspousal immunity: Application of domiciliary law. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Thompson 
v. Thompson,1 noted in the 1964 SURVEy,2 held that the question of 
interspousal immunity for tort was governed by the domiciliary state's 
law. The same court in Johnson v. Johnson,3 in which the facts are 
the reverse of Thompson, has again determined that the spouses' 
domicile is controlling for choice of law as to interspousal immunity 
in tort cases. 
In Johnson a wife brought an action for damages against her hus-
band in the New Hampshire court for injuries resulting from an 
automobile accident while they were driving in New Hampshire. The 
couple were domiciled in Massachusetts. The defendant husband 
moved to dismiss the action, primarily on the ground that the Massa-
chusetts law of interspousal immunity barred the action between 
Massachusetts domiciliaries. The motion was denied. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire sustained the defendant's excep-
tion, holding that the Massachusetts law of interspousal immunity did 
govern the action. 
Before the Thompson decision it was well-settled law in New 
Hampshire that although a wife could bring a tort action against her 
husband for acts of negligence committed in New Hampshire, her 
right to recover against him for personal injuries inflicted upon her in 
another state was determined by the law of the second state.4 This 
deference shown to the lex loci delicti by New Hampshire law in the 
matter of interspousal tort suits was in accord with the traditional 
vested rights doctrine.5 In Thompson, however, where the injury took 
place in Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire refused 
to apply the Massachusetts rule which bars interspousal suits.6 It was 
there recognized that whatever the purposes of the Massachusetts law, 
they related to Massachusetts spouses. Those purposes would not be 
impaired in any way by giving effect to the purposes of the contrary 
New Hampshire rule in a suit between New Hampshire spouses. The 
court thereby endorsed the trend toward choosing the interspousal law 
of the domicile as having the greatest interest in the matter.7 
In Johnson the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized that the 
§10.4. 1105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). 
2 See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.5. 
3216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966). 
4 See Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934). 
5 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 168-169 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Stumberg, Con-
flict of Laws 205-207 (3d ed. 1963). 
6 G.L., c. 209, §6; Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948). 
7 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §390g (Tent. Draft No.9, 1964); 
Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 581-583 (1962). 
6
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law of the domicile, Massachusetts, prohibiting interspousal suits, 
conflicted with the purpose of the New Hampshire tort law which was 
to give financial protection to persons injured on New Hampshire 
highways. The court, however, using the "significant relationship" 
test employed in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second,s decided 
to give effect to the law of the domicile here as it did in Thompson. 
Recognition of the Massachusetts immunity would not render a 
Massachusetts spouse less careful on New Hampshire roads since 
careless driving on his part would jeopardize the safety of both spouses. 
The court also pointed out that the application of New Hampshire 
law would expose the defendant's insurer to greater liability than it 
would have anticipated in computing its rates. Finally, the choice of 
the domiciliary law provided a simple rule that would remain constant 
as the spouses journeyed from state to state. For these reasons, the 
court concluded that the interspousal law of Massachusetts had such 
a significant relationship to the issue in dispute as to overcome the 
ordinary preference for the application of New Hampshire law to 
determine the rights of persons injured on New Hampshire highways. 
The traditional place-of-impact rule was an easy principle to apply, 
but since it ignored the purposes of the conflicting laws of the respec-
tive states, it often produced results that were not justifiable. Under the 
significant relationship approach, a court makes its own determination 
as to controlling contacts for choice of law purposes. This more recent 
approach obviously creates problems with respect to the certainty and 
predictability of legal rules, but it represents a much more rational use 
of the judicial process. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the 
present case, opted for the interspousal law of Massachusetts after it 
had considered the purposes of the respective state laws in conflict. 
The court, in this thoughtful opinion, has made a contribution to the 
recent trend to examine and solve conflict problems in a more 
realistic way. 
§lO.5. Merger doctrine: Non-termination by judgment. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff merges his cause of action, so that the original 
cause of action is terminated and cannot be sued upon again in the 
same or any other court. Thereafter the judgment itself is a cause of 
action, which may become the basis of a later action in the same or 
another state.1 The judgment, however, does not destroy all traces of 
the underlying cause of action, and the rights of the successful plaintiff 
in his original cause persist. In Jay's Stores, Inc. v. Ann Lewis Shops, 
Inc.,2 the New York Court of Appeals has called attention to this 
limitation upon the merger doctrine. 
The defendant, a Delaware corporation authorized to do business 
in New York, executed an instrument in New York guaranteeing to 
S Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §§379, 390g (Tent. Draft No.9, 1964). 
§1O.5. 1 Leflar, Conflict of Laws 131 (1959); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 1I0 
(3d ed. 1963); see Restatement of Judgments §§47-55 (1942). 
215 N.Y.2d 141, 256 N.Y.S.2d 600, 204 N.E.2d 638 (1965). 
7
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the plaintiff certain obligations of a third party under a sublease of 
business property in Massachusetts. The owner of the property insti-
tuted an action in Massachusetts in which both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were parties, and a judgment was entered March I, 1957, 
determining liabilities between the present parties based on the 
defendant's instrument of guarantee. During the pendency of that 
action, on March 15, 1956, the defendant filed a certificate of surrender 
of authority to do business in New York which, as the applicable New 
York statute required, included a consent that process in an action 
"upon any liability or obligation incurred within the State of New 
York" before the surrender of authority might be served upon the New 
York Secretary of State.3 
The plaintiff began the present action on the Massachusetts judg-
ment against the defendant by service upon the Secretary of State. The 
defendant argued that, since the Massachusetts judgment was not a 
"liability or obligation incurred" within New York, no jurisdiction 
had been obtained of the defendant by the service upon the Secretary 
of State of New York. The New York Supreme Court at Special Term 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Appel-
late Division affirmed. 
The New York Court of Appeals found that the main question in 
the case was whether, because the contract which the Massachusetts 
court enforced by its judgment was made by the defendant in New 
York, the present action on the Massachusetts judgment was to be 
deemed an action on a "liability or obligation incurred" by the defen-
dant in New York. The answer to this question depended upon the 
proper understanding of the theory of merger of a judgment and its 
underlying cause of action. 
Merger by judgment did not destroy all of the identifying charac-
terestics or relationships of the cause of action which the judgment 
determined. And it was clear that the doctrine was not designed to 
weaken rights which the prevailing party had in his original cause and 
which he succeeded in establishing by judgment in his favor. Hence 
the court would examine the basis of the Massachusetts judgment to 
determine its enforceability and effect in New York. The United States 
Supreme Court has endorsed this interpretation of the merger doctrine 
in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance CO.,4 as follows: 
The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are 
not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the technical 
rules, which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, 
and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay 
it, do not preclude a court, to which a judgment is presented for 
affirmative action, ... from ascertaining whether the claim is 
3 Business Corporation Law, Consol. Laws, c. 4, §uno. 
4 127 U.S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239 (1888). 
8
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really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce 
it.5 
The Court of Appeals, following this direction of decisional law, 
ruled that the present action on the Massachusetts judgment should 
be treated as an action upon a "liability or obligation incurred" 
within New York before the surrender of authority, since the Massa-
chusetts judgment was based on such a liability whose characteristics 
to this extent survived the Massachusetts adjudication. Hence, the 
service upon the New York Secretary of State was sufficient to acquire 
jurisdiction of the defendant under the terms of the statute which 
governed the surrender of authority. The court, therefore, reversed 
the order below and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for 
the sum statled in the Massachusetts judgment. 
§IO.6. Conditional sale: Repossession of chattel. The cases deal-
ing with conditional sales of chattels continue as a prolific source of 
complexities in the law of conflicts. A basic cause of the difficulty is the 
fact that most transactions involving chattels have both contractual 
and proprietary aspects. Questions relating to interests in a chattel are 
controlled by the law of the situs. Essentially contractual matters, such 
as the right to damages for breach of warranty or excuses for non-
performance, are determined by the law governing the contract. 
Issues collateral to repossession under a conditional sale, such as the 
creditor's right to hold the debtor liable for any deficiency remaining 
after the repossession, are also governed by the contractual conflicts 
rules.1 Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary2 involved such an issue. 
In this case the Civil Court of the City of New York, applying the 
Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code, refused to permit recovery 
of a deficiency. The defendant, a serviceman, purchased an automobile 
in the District of Columbia on a conditional sales contract. The dealer 
assigned the contract to the plaintiff, a national finance company, 
which notified the defendant to make payments to it. Despite a con-
tract provision against removal of the car from the District of 
Columbia, the defendant buyer, under official military orders, moved 
to Massachusetts with the car and made several payments to the 
Massachusetts office of the plaintiff finance company. When the 
defendant defaulted in his payments, the plaintiff repossessed the car 
in Massachusetts and, pursuant to the terms of the contract, resold the 
car without notice at a private sale in Massachusetts for less than half 
of the original price. The defendant later came to New York where he 
was served in the present action by the plaintiff to recover the 
deficiency. 
5Id. at 292-293, 8 Sup. Ct. at 1375, 32 L. Ed. at 244. 
§10.6. 1 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second, §281, Introductory Note 
at 81 (Tent. Draft No.5, 1959). 
247 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965). 
9
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The court stated that the law of New York would not permit a suit 
for a deficiency if the requirements of the law relating to repossession 
and resale had not been satisfied. The critical question was, therefore, 
which law governed the validity of the resale. The New York conflicts 
rule with respect to contracts applies the "significant relationship" or 
"grouping of contacts" test.3 By this criterion, New York statutes 
governing repossession and resale procedures in conditional sales 
would have no application to a District of Columbia contract which 
was the subject of an enforcement suit in Massachusetts, the suit 
being brought at a time when neither of the parties had any relation 
to New York. The choice, then, lay between the law of Massachusetts 
and the law of the District of Columbia as to whether there had been 
a valid resale. The former required a notice of resale,4 while the latter 
permitted resale without notice.1i .. 
The court, noting that the action was not concerned with the 
validity of the contract but with the remedies for an admitted breach 
of an admittedly valid contract, concluded that the law of Massachu-
setts governed the resale. Since the repossession and the resale took 
place in Massachusetts, and since Massachusetts had the usual interest 
of the situs in the peaceful possession of property within it borders, the 
law of Massachusetts clearly had the significant relationship to this 
aspect of the transaction between the parties. 
The apposite Massachusetts law, the Uniform Commercial Code, 
had its own built-in conflicts rules which would determine whether 
Massachusetts would judge the resale without notice to be legal or 
illegal. Section 1-105(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly 
provides for the application of Section 9-102 to secured transactions.6 
This section calls for applying its own provisions to "any personal 
property ... within the jurisdiction of this state."7 The New York 
court concluded that Massachusetts would rule that, since the failure 
to give notice violated Section 9-504, the resale was illegal. It held, 
therefore, that New York would not permit recovery of any deficiency. 
The court in the present case, in considering the choice of law 
problem, rejected the plaintiff's contention that the lex loci contractus 
should control. It chose rather the "contacts" standard enunciated in 
the New York Court of Appeals decision of Auten v. Auten.8 The 
court also cited with approbation the "significant relationship" test 
enunciated in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second.9 This 
newer approach to the contracts problem in the conflict of laws permits 
a court to focus its attention upon the law of the jurisdiction which 
3 See Auten v. Auten, lI08 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
4 G.L., c. 106, §9-504. 
Ii D.C. Code Ann. §28-1409 (1961). The District of Columbia has since adopted 
the Uniform Commercial Code. See D.C. Code Ann. tit. 28, §9-504. 
6 G.L., c. 106, §1-105(2). 
7 Id. §9·102. 
8 lI08 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
9 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §lIlI2 (Tent. Draft No.6, 1960). 
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has the paramount interest in the multi-state transaction.10 The 
question of the resale arose from the dealings with the property by the 
parties in Massachusetts. The New York court, therefore, properly 
concluded that the law of Massachusetts governed the plaintiff's 
behavior in retaking and reselling the automobile. 
10 In any event, the traditional lex loci contractus rule had no application to 
the facts of the present case, since the validity and interpretation of the contract 
were not in issue. 
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